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Highlights
Introducing competition to the railway market is a long and difficult 
process and it is still ongoing. The fourth railway package has been 
adopted making market opening in passenger railways mandatory in 
the upcoming years.
Therefore the debate is now evolving from a theoretical conversation 
to a very concrete debate on how to put a railway system based on 
competition into practice. 
The Florence Railway Executive Seminar brought together the 
commissions’ Directorate General for Mobility (DG MOVE) as well as 
the Directorate General for Competition (DG COMP) to discuss with 
academics and sector representatives.  Experts in competition law and 
experts in sector specific regulation brought forward many different 
ideas of how competition regulation in railways might actually look 
like.
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This European Transport Regulation Observer 
reflects upon the discussions at the Florence Execu-
tive Seminar “Competition in Passenger Railways in 
Europe” that took place in Florence on 15/06/2017. 
Competition in Passenger Railways in 
Europe
A Comment by Matthias Finger
The European Commission still considers increased 
competition as the main tool to make railways more 
competitive and foster the modal shift from road to 
rail in both passenger and freight. Neither modal 
shift nor competition in railways has happened 
on a significant scale, even though both are not 
necessarily directly related. Indeed, modal shift (and 
in particular the reduction of the use of the private 
car) depends on many other things as well, including 
oil prices, the internalisation of environmental 
externalities on road transport, emerging intermodal 
competition with bus transport and new forms of 
sharing mobility. 
On the other hand, fostering competition in passenger 
rail transport – while still being a worthwhile goal, 
even though not necessarily the most effective 
weapon against the above trends – turns out to be 
more complicated than originally anticipated, owing 
in particular to the technological nature of railways 
with its heavy implications on both operations and 
financing. Let me finally mention that this discussion 
about furthering competition in railways comes after 
the adoption of the 4th Railway Package, following 
a lengthy process which has strained most involved 
parties. The uncontested success of this 4th Railway 
Package is its technical pillar aiming at harmonizing 
technical standards and thus at fostering technical 
interoperability without which no competition in 
railways is ever going to take place in Europe.
Enter DG Competition, and this is the real novelty 
for railways and railway operators, for the European 
Commission itself and for railway regulation more 
generally. Indeed, the real novelty consists of no 
longer looking at railways from a purely sectoral 
regulatory perspective (i.e., the railways’ perspective) 
but also from a competition regulatory perspective. 
While historically so-called access competition 
has already been approached from a sectoral 
regulatory perspective (and led to the creation of 
sector specific rail regulators), other competition 
relevant dimensions – such as tendering of PSO 
(Public Services Obligation) contracts, anti-trust 
considerations and state aid issues – were more 
difficult to approach from a purely sectoral point of 
view, as they are by their very nature transversal.
There is indeed a solid theory and a long-lasting 
practice of regulating tendering (of contracts), state 
aid and anti-trust among academics and competition 
regulators at global, EU and national levels, and this 
theory and practice should now also come to bear 
on the railways, as railways are gradually entering 
competition, not the least because of growing 
technical interoperability. 
Yet, our Florence Executive Seminar clearly showed 
that applying competition regulation to railways and 
especially integrating competition regulation and 
railway sector specific regulation is more easily said 
than done. Most of the Seminar was therefore spent 
on trying to understand what competition regulation 
in railways would actually mean and entail, not in 
theory, but in practice.
And rail specificities abound; let me highlight here 
the four most important ones:
• There is first the technological specificity of 
railways, characterised mainly by difficult and 
costly interoperability between rail infrastructures 
(namely tracks) and train operations (mainly 
locomotives and wagons). Such interoperability 
makes not only access competition difficult but 
it also adds complexity to tendering, inasmuch 
as investments in rail infrastructure and train 
operations have different time horizons. 
• There is secondly the fact that railways are 
never self-financing. A significant portion of 
any railway system will always be subsidized, 
in EU on average for approx. 50% of its costs. 
Furthermore, public subsidies are paid both 
for a portion of the infrastructure, as well as 
for a portion of train operations, thus creating 
problems for tendering, as well as potential 
market distortions, not to mention potential 
state aid problems.
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• On top of this comes the fact that many 
infrastructure managers or integrated companies 
are indebted, thus distorting the level playing 
field even further, as well as raising issues with 
regard to state aid rules.
• The fourth specificity, while having existed for a 
long time, has recently been much exacerbated by 
digitalisation, namely intermodal competition. 
Indeed, increasingly questions of and decisions 
about anti-trust in railways will have to take 
into account the evolution in adjacent markets, 
especially in the long-distance bus and the long-
distance car-sharing markets.
It must be made clear that rail transport and 
modal shift to rail will always remain a public 
policy goal connected to growing road congestion 
and pressing CO2 emissions reduction goals. In 
other words, neither the member states nor the 
European Commission can afford for railways to 
decline. Therefore, whatever will be done in terms 
of fostering railway competition in Europe and with 
member states it will only be politically acceptable 
if it strengthens railways as a transport mode vis-
à-vis the other transport modes, or if it fosters 
intermodality, both in passenger and freight.
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Executive Seminar on Competition 
in Passenger Railways in Europe – 
an Overview of the Most Important 
Arguments
by Dr Gunnar Alexandersson, Stockholm School of 
Economics
A Summary of the Discussions 
This Executive Seminar brought together sector 
representatives, railway and competition regulators, and 
academics. The aim was to discuss the current state and 
future of competition in the passenger railway market, in 
particular against the background of the adoption of the 
4th Railway Package. 
A strong presence from the European Commission made 
it possible to raise a valuable discussion on a number of 
issues in terms of both appropriate regulations and the 
underlying intentions, even if the adopted framework 
does deviate quite a bit from the original proposal. A few 
specific topics from the discussion are highlighted below. 
The meaning and importance of coordination was 
discussed from several different viewpoints. Some 
speakers stressed the need to avoid misaligned incentives 
between an increasing number of (unbundled) actors such 
as infrastructure managers and railway undertakings, in 
order to ensure coordinated investments and actions to 
promote the overall competitiveness of rail. Examples 
on coordination were also presented in the form of 
cooperation between railway undertakings seeking 
to offer better international services. Representatives 
from the Commission highlighted the need to promote 
good coordination (seeking to achieve better services) 
while avoiding bad coordination (such as cooperating 
to collude). This may not be so easy in practice, but one 
important pre-requisite for good coordination could be to 
make the needs and priorities of all actors as transparent 
as possible.
Another important topic discussed was the role 
and possibilities for open access competition and 
competitive PSO tendering. The 4th Railway Package 
aims at opening up the EU’s railway market by means 
of promoting both types of competition, sometimes 
referred to as competition in the market vs. competition 
for the market. One particular problem to be handled 
is the fact that these two types sometimes come into 
conflict. The regulator in Great Britain, Office of Rail 
and Road, has developed a sophisticated way of ensuring 
that new open access operators are not merely cherry-
picking against franchised services, the so-called Not 
Primarily Abstractive (NPA) test. The implementation 
of the 4th Railway Package foresees the development 
of an (optional) Economic Equilibrium Test, checking 
open access services against the need to uphold financial 
stability in tendered networks which may include both 
commercially viable and non-viable lines. One problem 
with this is that it removes the competitive pressure and 
fostering effects that may come from the threat of cherry-
picking. Moreover, open access passenger operators may 
also have to face special levy charges. Several participants 
at the seminar criticised this idea and it was suggested 
that it might be better to, for example, have all actors 
pay a fair contribution to the fixed infrastructure costs. 
Finding a good balance between open access competition 
and competitively tendered services is an important one, 
and should also take into account the general difficulty 
for commercial operators to compete against services 
that are subsidised in one way or the other.
The role and future of the incumbents got some 
attention during the seminar. With the exception of Great 
Britain, where the incumbent British Rail was dismantled 
entirely as part of railway reform more than 20 years ago, 
there are a number of incumbent railway undertakings in 
the EU Member States, and most of them are still state-
owned. The Commission was quick to point out that the 
intention is not to push incumbents out of the market. 
While incumbents may sometimes still be in control of 
essential facilities and have other advantages, they may 
also carry heavy burdens of debt and difficulties when 
it comes to improving efficiency by means of laying 
off staff, for example. Several examples were given on 
incumbents that had been able to transform themselves 
under increased competitive pressure, but the question 
was raised that if entrants are still more efficient, can we 
accept the exit of incumbents? If competition is to work 
properly we want a level playing field, but at the same 
time we cannot have every firm be exactly the same as all 
the others, since that would stifle innovation and make 
efficiency gains meaningless. One solution might be to 
adapt the role of the state in terms of responsibilities.  
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Towards the end, the seminar touched upon the 
difference between sector-specific (ex ante) regulation 
vs more general (ex post) competition policy. For a long 
time the EU railway sector has been increasingly subject 
to sector-specific regulations. While these can be more 
powerful and faster, they can also be too intrusive and 
ultimately fail in achieving the underlying intentions. 
Most Member States are now busy contemplating how 
to implement the 4th Railway Package, some opting for 
increasing competition as much as possible, while others 
take a more cautious and transitionary approach. It will 
be interesting to follow the outcomes both at the national 
levels and the EU level, and what we may learn for the 
future development of EU railway policy.
Italy’s Successful Story of Open Access 
Entry
Pier Luigi Parcu, EUI, EUI, Director of the Florence 
Competition Programme, Director of the Commu-
nications & Media. Area of the Florence School of 
Regulation, Director of the The Centre for Media 
Pluralism and Media Freedom 
Silvia Solidoro, EUI, Research Associate, FCP & 
FSR
In the European Union, achieving a full liberalisation of 
domestic rail passenger markets is clearly one of the most 
important future challenges. A rigorous enforcement of 
competition law is instrumental to ensuring that the objective 
is met. However, several antitrust issues are currently affecting 
the sector in the majority of Member States: rail markets in 
the EU remain largely dominated by incumbents, which are 
very frequently vertically integrated into infrastructure. This 
is particularly true with reference to train paths. New entrants 
are usually deterred by some significant advantages held by 
state-owned operators: there exist high entry barriers related 
to access to key installations, such as rail infrastructure, 
including stations, rail-related service facilities, and access to 
rolling stock. As a result, open access operations have been 
limited to niche markets so far. Finally, State Aid, restructuring 
aid and other contributions often are not consistent with 
the market investor principle nor justified by public service 
obligations: in the EU region, the amount of state subsidies 
is estimated to be of €18 to €20 billion per year, excluding 
infrastructure investment. 
Experiences of on-track competition in the passenger railway 
sector therefore appear limited. However, in the last few years, 
a wave of open access entry has occurred in some countries, 
with private operators gaining 20-30% of market share in 
long-distance corridors (Casullo, 2016). One successful story 
comes from Italy where the entrance of a new competitor, 
Nuovo Trasporto Viaggiatori (‘NTV’), in the high-speed rail 
(‘HSR’) market, significantly improved the overall mobility 
of the system and brought several advantages to consumers, 
such as more supply and capacity, more frequency and 
connections, more differentiated services at lower prices and 
the possibility to choose between providers. This situation has 
been favoured by the attitude of the newcomer, who accepted 
the investment risk linked to its entrance and developed an 
innovative business model. It has been estimated that in 2013, 
NTV operated 12.5 billion train-km, equivalent to a market 
share of 20-25% on the high-speed network (Bergantino et al. 
2013) and an overall 2.5% share nationally. Another key role 
has been played by the Government who financed the HSR 
dedicated network and made competition feasible by solving 
the major capacity constraints affecting the largest business 
routes. Furthermore, the regulatory pattern followed by the 
national regulator made it possible to decrease the level of 
access charges; in turn, this enlarged the scope for profitable 
entry of new operators. 
While it is true that some aspects are specific to the Italian 
market structure, one should also recognise that some 
lessons to be learned can be drawn from this model. Open 
access competition seems to have facilitated a ‘win-win’ game 
between the actors involved in the HSR sector, with several 
positive effects for the whole system (Croccolo and Violi, 
2013). The incumbent’s response to the competitive pressure 
resulted in a cut of the operational costs and improvement 
of the services (Desmaris, 2016). Even the infrastructure 
manager benefitted from a greater utilisation of the rail 
network.
Similar examples come from the Czech Republic and Austria. 
Each of them provides great support to the European liberali-
sation policy endorsed by the 4th railway package. As stated by 
the European Commission, competition in the sector should 
be able to enhance the attractiveness of rail while making the 
sector more responsive to customers’ needs, as well as allowing 
rail operators to compete with other modes. It remains to be 
seen to what extent the process will be impacted by external 
factors, such as the current European economic crisis.
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Compeititon in the Rail Passenger 
Market – Prospects and Issues
Chris Nash, Institute for Transport Studies, Univer-
sity of Leeds, Masaryk University, Brno and CERRE
With the fourth railway package, the rail passenger market 
should finally become open to competition, for the market 
via competitive tendering for public service contracts in 2023 
and via open access for commercial services in 2019. But 
there remain many reasons why market opening may not be 
complete.
Firstly, the legislation itself contains loopholes. Regarding 
public service contracts, direct awards will still be permitted if 
this can be justified to an appropriate independent body such 
as the rail regulator. Regarding open access competition, this 
may still be restricted (or subject to a PSO levy) if it disturbs the 
financial equilibrium of public service contracts. It is widely 
expected that some countries will use these loopholes to try to 
prevent competitive entry, although in some including France 
– long opposed to competitive entry – domestic pressure for 
reform now seems so strong that some movement towards 
competition seems inevitable.
But secondly, new entrants will have to contend with strong 
state owned incumbents who possess many advantages, 
including in many cases control of passenger stations, 
ticketing and information systems, maintenance depots and 
cleaning and refuelling facilities. Although legislation is in 
place which should ensure access to such facilities on fair 
terms, in some countries this may prove a struggle.
Moreover, it is likely that the move towards competitive entry 
will be gradual, with public sector incumbents retaining a 
dominant position. This may open the possibility of various 
uncompetitive practices, such as cross subsidy of services 
where competition is strong by those where monopoly power 
remains and predatory pricing. Dealing with these will stretch 
the capabilities of the competition authorities in this area.
Regarding competitive tendering for public service contracts, 
there remain many issues – geographical size, length of 
contract, degree of control over prices and services – where 
it is unclear what works best. There appear to be broadly two 
successful models. Where an appropriate regional authority 
can take the lead on planning and marketing services, 
including pricing and timetables, then tightly specified short 
gross cost contracts make sense. Where the task of developing 
and marketing services is entrusted to the operator, much 
longer net cost contracts will give more appropriate incentives.
But open access competition for commercial services is 
a more complex issue. On the one hand, wherever such 
competition exists, benefits for consumers - lower fares and 
better services - have resulted. But in every case except Britain 
this has been in competition with public sector incumbents 
who were previously monopolists, so this says nothing about 
whether open access competition or competitive tendering is 
superior for commercial services. In Britain, estimating the 
net benefits of open access entry is complicated by the fact 
that open access entrants do not pay towards the fixed costs of 
the infrastructure, or a premium to government to help pay 
for non commercial services, whereas franchisees do, so the 
benefits to consumers of open access entry are partly at least 
paid for by the taxpayer.
But there are other complications. Firstly, which services are 
commercial at all is heavily influenced by the approach of the 
country towards track access charges. If the government is 
willing to pay most of the fixed costs of the infrastructure, as 
in Sweden, then low track access charges may make services 
commercial and attract entry. But if the government expects 
users to pay a large share of the costs of the infrastructure, 
high track access charges will render most services in need 
of subsidy and greatly limit the scope for commercial entry.
Whatever approach to competition is adopted, two issues 
are likely to be critical. Firstly is access to rolling stock. If 
governments continue to buy rolling stock for incumbents 
which is not made available to new entrants and which is 
cut up rather than being sold when it is no longer needed, 
that will be a considerable barrier to entry. Secondly is the 
issue of what to do with existing staff. Where new entry has 
been a gradual process, it has been possible to leave entrants 
to recruit their own staff at their own wages and conditions, 
with existing staff free to choose whether to move or to stay 
with the incumbent. With an ageing workforce, the resulting 
need to transfer staff to new duties has been manageable. But 
if countries now starting on the reform process want a fast 
pace of change, then the issue of whether staff should transfer 
to new operators and on what terms and conditions becomes 
key. No doubt this is an area with major potential for disputes 
as the fourth package is implemented.
For further discussion of these issues see:
Nash Chris, Crozet, Yves, Link services, H, Nilsson, J.E. and 
Smith A.S.J.  (2016) Liberalisation of rail passenger. Brussels: 
CERRE. available on line at www.cerre.eu/rail                                                    
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Further Readings
Finger, M., Kupfer, D., Montero, J., 2016, 
‘Competition in the railway passenger market’. 
Florence: European University Institute 
doi:10.2870/279285
In recent years new developments in the railway market 
have brought about several new insights about the effects 
of competition in the sector. In the context of a workshop 
in Madrid organised by the UNED University in the realm 
of the research project REGUTRAIN, some practical 
cases in Europe were discussed. New entrants that offer 
competitive passenger rail services have brought down 
prices and increased frequencies significantly in several 
instances. Yet, the debate showed that whether these 
developments are beneficial for the system on the whole 
remains an open question.
Montero, J., Ramos, R., Giuricin, A. 2016, ‘Open 
with Care: The Duopoly Model for the Transition to 
Competition in Long-Distance Passenger Railway 
Transportation’. Competition and Regulation in 
Network Industries, Vol 17 (2016), No. 3–4
Railways present specific obstacles for the introduction 
of competition. The duopoly model for the transition 
to competition makes it possible to overcome some 
of these obstacles. The granting of a second license 
allows governments to control the process and exclude 
opportunistic market entry limited to high-volume routes 
with high margins. Temporary exclusion of contestability 
allows the newcomer to achieve the necessary economies 
of density and scale. Finally, more limited competition 
allows the incumbent adapting to the new market 
structure by reducing costs and putting an end to internal 
cross-subsidies.
Nash, C., Crozet, Y., Link, H., Nilsson, H., and 
Smith, A.S.J., 2016, ‘Liberalisation of rail passenger’ 
Brussels: CERRE
Where it has occurred, liberalisation of passenger rail 
services in Europe has largely been successful, with 
improved services, increased traffic and reduced support 
from public finances. This offers lessons for markets 
that are yet to be liberalised. It also points to a number 
of key questions and difficult issues that policy-makers 
will have to address. In markets that have yet to undergo 
liberalisation, the report identifies a number of trade-offs 
to be faced by policy-makers. Those include: choosing a 
path to liberalisation – through competitive tendering 
for public service contracts, or open access for the 
operation of commercial services, or some combination 
of the two; deciding which levels of government should 
be responsible for competitive tendering: devolving 
this to regional administrations or maintaining central 
coordination; determining the optimal size and duration 
of franchises to maximise economies of scale and density; 
allocating risk-sharing between private operators and the 
state; dealing with the political and social implications of 
potentially transferring large numbers of public-sector 
staff to private companies.
Benedetto, V., Smith, A.S.J., Nash, C. A., 2017, 
‘Evaluating the roles and powers of rail regulatory 
bodies in Europe: A survey-based approach’, in 
Transport Policy, Vol. 59, pp. 116-123
European railways have been shaped by multiple reforms 
since the mid-1990s, covering industry structure, market 
opening and economic regulation. However, the literature 
has given little attention to the latter; namely the evolution 
and impacts of regulatory reforms amongst Europe’s 
railways. This paper fills this gap by providing an up-to-
date, bottom-up assessment of current rail regulatory 
practice in Europe. The results show that European rail 
regulators, in general, exhibit many of the features of 
ideal regulation; in particular around key features such 
as independence, resourcing, longevity and expertise, 
transparency and in turn stability and predictability. 
However, the article finds that rail regulatory bodies 
could take a more proactive role in shaping track access 
charges, given their importance in respect of efficient 
use of the network and maintaining non-discriminatory 
access. Importantly, there is also scope for regulators to 
play a greater role in regulating the efficiency and quality 
of infrastructure managers, and potentially becoming 
more involved in the designing stages of passenger 
market opening as it emerges; and these changes could 
deliver substantial beneficial impacts for rail users and 
funders across Europe.
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CNMC, 2014, ‘Discussion paper on the process for 
liberalizing rail passenger transport’, 25/06/2014, 
PRO/DTSP/0001/14
In Spain, the rail passenger transport market is largely 
closed to competition, except for the so-called services 
operated on their mainly tourist value, which were 
liberalised in 2013. The opening-up of the railway 
market has been gradual, driven by the railway 
packages passed at the Community level1. In 2003, 
Act 39/2003 of 17 November on the Railway Sector 
was passed in Spain, leading to the liberalisation of 
freight services by rail in 2005. Subsequently, in 2010, 
the opening-up of international passenger transport 
took place. (…) By summarising the knowledge 
gathered by the Competence and Regulation Authorities 
in the processes of liberalising the network industries, 
and in order to promote a suitable framework for the 
liberalisation of rail passenger transport, the CNMC 
wishes to contribute to the process with this document.
Casullo, L., 2016, ‘The Efficiency Impact of Open 
Access Competition in Rail Markets - The Case of 
Domestic Passenger Services in Europe’, Interna-
tional Transport Forum Discussion Paper 2016/07
On-track competition in passenger services has 
traditionally been limited in European railways, with 
private operators offering marginal services in selected 
corridors in the UK, Sweden and Germany only. In 
recent years, a larger scale and more stable wave of 
open access market entry has occurred in Austria, the 
Czech Republic and Italy, where open access operators 
have gained market shares of 20-30% in long-distance 
corridors. Economic theory suggests that competition 
can result in productive efficiencies, although theories 
of competition are potentially outweighed by market 
characteristics which make monopoly a more efficient 
market structure when applied to the rail sector. The 
contestability of rail markets is further hampered by 
the presence of several barriers to entry as well as 
expansion. The literature on the efficiency effect of rail 
policy changes is vast, but the focus to date has been 
on industry structure and competitive tendering, with 
non-conclusive results highlighting the importance of 
tailoring rail policies to the specific characteristics of 
each network. Studies have not yet attempted to measure 
the industry efficiency impact of passenger open access 
operations, neither specifically nor systematically – 
which is the goal of this paper.
 Perennes, P., 2017, ‘Open Access for Rail Pas senger 
Services in Europe: Lesson Learnt from Fore runner 
Countries’, Transportation Research Procedia, Vol. 
25, 2017, pp. 358-367
The fourth railway package –still discussed today by 
the European institutions - plans to open the whole rail 
transport market to competition in 2022. Currently, 
only freight transportation and international passenger 
services are open to competition. According to the 
fourth package, the market for regional transportation 
should be organised around franchises and therefore 
competition “for” the market. On the contrary, 
competition for long distance services - at least for 
profitable services – should be “open access”. This 
paper evaluates the potential consequences of this open 
access competition at the European level based on the 
consequences of open access competition in the seven 
forerunner countries that have already allowed for some 
form of open access competition. These experiences may 
give us some clues regarding the impact of open access 
in Europe. It inventories all the open access services that 
exist/have existed across Europe. Based on this database, 
the paper constructs standard profiles and strategies 
of new entrants. It finds that it takes several years for 
open access competition to settle after legal opening of 
passenger transportation market. For most of the new 
entrants, the financial strategy is to minimize risk. Wide-
scale entries with brand new rolling stock are extremely 
uncommon. Bankruptcy (or service interruption) are 
common. Therefore, it is unlikely that the fourth package 
implementation leads to a dramatic change in the 
functioning of the rail passenger transportation market.
Tomeš, Z., Kvizda, M., Jandová, M., Rederer, V., 
2016, ‘Open access passenger rail competition in the 
Czech Republic’, Transport Policy, Vol. 47, 203-211
This paper analyses open access passenger railway 
competition in the Czech Republic between 2011 
and 2014. This competition emerged when the major 
railway connection between Prague and Ostrava, which 
was operated only by the incumbent, was entered by 
two private operators, RegioJet in September 2011 
and LEO Express in January 2013. Theoretical studies 
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and experience from other countries suggest that this 
competition should lead to a price war, intensive market 
dynamics and product differentiation. The findings from 
the market development on the Prague–Ostrava route 
are broadly consistent with these predictions. The open 
access competition has led to an intensive price war with 
second class tariff declines reaching 46%. Innovative 
marketing and selling strategies have significantly 
increased the spread of prices, and price discrimination 
and yield management techniques are used extensively. 
All operators has been unprofitable on the line, leading 
to financial stress and accusations of predatory pricing 
on the part of the incumbent. The quality of service on 
the line has increased substantially with standardisation, 
new on-board services and higher frequency. The average 
number of seats per train has declined significantly, and 
new operators have been able to win 55% market share 
from the incumbent. Service frequency is higher but is 
strongly concentrated during rush hours.
